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RISK: ACCOUNTING FOR
AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE
H. STUART BURNESS*

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Modern technology has brought with it an increasing number of
activities which give rise to low-probability high-consequence risks
associated with potentially catastrophic events. Such risks have accompanied the development of nuclear power since its inception, although the manifestation of risks has varied over time. In this paper,
we wish to focus on risk management issues as they pertain to questions of nuclear waste storage and disposal. In order to set the stage
for this analysis, we first present a brief recapitulation of the history
of nuclear power and the emergence of problems concerning nuclear
waste management.
Commercial development of nuclear power in the United States
stemmed from the Atomic Energy Act of 19541 which mandated
AEC participation in research and development activities designed to
create a viable commercial nuclear power industry. The major effort
in this direction by the AEC was the Power Reactor Demonstration
Program (PRDP) 2 under which a number of demonstration reactors
of various types (light water, gas cooled, breeder) were built under
joint financing by the AEC and utilities and/or reactor manufacturers.
Hesitancy on the part of utilities and electrical supply industries to
adopt the nuclear technology, however, resulted in part from the
Atomic Energy Act's stipulation3 that nuclear technology must be
regulated to protect the health and safety of the public. Their unwillingness to participate in reactor development programs stemmed
largely from fears of the tremendous liabilities that might arise in the
event of a major accident. Neither the private insurance industry nor
the federal government was willing to underwrite such a program. To
these entities, insuring reactor development programs appeared tantamount to writing a blank check.
*Professor of Economics, the University of New Mexico. This research was supported in
part under DOE Grant No. DE-FG04-79ET4401; however, the author alone is responsible
for the views expressed here.

1. 42 U.S.C. § 2011.
2. See W. D. Montgomery and J. D. Quirk, Cost Escalation in Nuclear Power, in PERSPECTIVES IN ENERGY (M. Firebough, Ed., forthcoming).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2012(c).
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As a consequence, the Price Anderson Act (1957)' was passed.
Under the provisions of the Act, suppliers were indemnified and all
public liability from a nuclear accident was assigned to the electric
utility owning the plant.' High capital costs and AEC lags in development activities resulted in a cessation of reactor orders in 1961, in
spite of the favorable climate provided by the Price Anderson Act. In
1962, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy responded by earmarking 20 million dollars of previously appropriated AEC funds to be
used for design, construction, and operating subsidies for large scale
light water reactors. 6 Clearly, if not ostensibly, this appropriation
was made in an effort to defray the risk costs associated with the
commercial demonstration of nuclear power viability. 7 The Committee's creation of an insurance fund was followed by the turnkey era
in nuclear power: what ultimately was viewed as an effort by the
major reactor manufacturers to spur commercial nuclear growth by
internalizing risk costs within the reactor manufacturing industry.8
Throughout these developments, little attention was given the problem of waste disposal, at least in the sense of economic and financial
feasibility considerations. The combination of low probabilities and
high discount rates in expected present value calculations appears to
have rendered waste disposal considerations insignificant in relation
to the high (up-front) capital costs of nuclear plants.
While industry and government analyzed the implicit commercial
feasibility of nuclear powered electricity generation, the federal government became heavily involved in a defense-oriented nuclear pro4. Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (Sept. 2, 1957).
5. Id. Amendments to Sec. 170, (a)-(e). In the event of a nuclear accident, the utility involved was to be indemnified from any liability, in excess of 560 million dollars. Roughly
165 million dollars of this was underwritten by private insurance companies based on the
usual risk assessment practices. The remaining liability was to be financed by the Federal
government with utility premiums based on the size and number of plants rather than on
risk assessment. In the event of liability exceeding 560 million dollars, claims were to be
prorated downwards in inverse proportion to total damages. Also, by industry agreement,
every reactor facility in the United States could be assessed up to $5 million in liability coverage for an accident at any one of them, so an additional $360 million in coverage existed.
6. U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, CIVILIAN NUCLEAR POWER-A REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT- 1962.
7. See, e.g., LINDA COHEN, OPTIMAL COMPENSATION SYSTEMS: THE CASE OF
THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT (paper presented at the Conference on the Economics of
Nuclear Power Regulation, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., February 6-7,
1978).
8. See Burness, Montgomery, and Quirk, The Turnkey Era in Nuclear Power, 56 LAND
ECON. 188 (May -1980); also, by the same authors, Capital Contractingand the Regulated
Firm, 70 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 342-54 (June 1980). Related discussions appear in MONTGOMERY and QUIRK, COST ESCALATION IN NUCLEAR POWER (EQL
Memo. No. 21, Environmental Quality Laboratory, Pasadena: California Institute of Technology, 1978).
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gram of substantial magnitude. Defense nuclear programs and public
concern regarding waste disposal are well known facts. An increase in
public concern with the potentially catastrophic nature of nuclear
accidents/occurrences accompanied both the federal defense and
commercial power programs. Recently this concern has extended
into the arena of waste storage or disposal-more generally, waste
management. Although the public tends to perceive spent fuel from
commercial reactors as the source of the waste management problem,
the bulk of the volume of nuclear waste by roughly an order of magnitude derives from defense related processes.9 [However, since commercial waste involves high-level spent fuel, a curie count or radioactivity comparison is not so unbalanced.] Waste management problems,
nevertheless, are significant in terms of both commercial and defense
wastes.
There are roughly a half-dozen waste disposal sites in the United
States, some of which have been closed. The only permanent site is
under construction near Carlsbad, New Mexico.' 0 This plant, the
Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP), provides for the .underground
storage of primarily low-level wastes in salt. The curie content of
waste shipments to the WIPP will be roughly 0.02% of estimated
curie content of all types of radioactive shipments in 1985.' ' Consequently, this facility must be considered as experimental, in terms of
technology assessment.
RISK AND POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC EVENTS
In the previous section, we traced the development of the nuclear
power industry and observed various manifestations of risk throughout this development. We made observations of risk manifestations
with regard to defense-oriented nuclear programs as well. Our ultimate goal is to focus on the risk characteristics of waste management
programs and potential policy options for dealing with these risks.
Toward this end, it is helpful to begin with a slightly more general
9. See, e.g., G. WHAN and H. S. BURNESS, STUDY OF THE FEASIBILITY OF DEVELOPING URANIUM PROCESSING FACILITIES IN NEW MEXICO IX-3 (Report No.
NE83(80)EMD-701-1), State of New Mexico, Energy and Minerals Division (September
1980).
10. Borehole drilling commenced in January, 1981.
11. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL
STATEMENT ON THE TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL BY AIR
AND OTHER MODES 1-18 (NUREG-0170, Washington, D.C., December 1977); and R. G.
CUMMINGS, H. S. BURNESS, and R. D. NORTON, THE PROPOSED WASTE ISOLATION
PILOT PROJECT (WIPP) AND IMPACTS ON THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO: A SOCIOECONOMIC ANALYSIS 7.9-10 (New Mexico Energy Research and Development Program,
EMD 2-67-1139, April 1981) [hereinafter cited as EMD 11391.
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analysis of risk as it relates to potentially catastrophic events, events
characterized by low-probability occurrence and high-consequence
outcomes. Potentially catastrophic events present an essentially different kind of risk from that associated with uncertainty in more
normal, everyday modes of decision making. Policy options for dealing with these risks require, among other things, an assessment of the
present value of expected damages. In the context of potentially catastrophic events, however, a number of other issues arise. Since the
relevant events may not occur until some time in the future, perhaps
quite distant, the problem of balancing these future costs and present
benefits arises; in particular, problems concerning discounting, intergenerational equity, and appropriate welfare criteria arise.' 2 As the
occurrence of such an event may involve loss of life, perhaps on a
widespread basis, problems associated with valuing human life are introduced.' ' The expected damages from such events are computed
by taking the product of occurrence probabilities and the physical
damages associated with an event; consequently, significant uncertainties in scientific estimates of the parameters of potentially catastrophic events exist and discrepancies between scientific estimates
and public perceptions of such estimates make policy determination
difficult.' I
Each of these problems renders policy making with respect to lowprobability high-consequence events extremely paradoxical. Decisions must still be made, and we wish to explore the manner in which
this might be done. We commence with an overview of the problem
as it pertains to nuclear waste management.
The evaluation of the risk associated with technology development
in general, and nuclear power specifically, whether one considers a
nuclear reactor or the disposal of nuclear wastes, is particularly difficult because of the lack of substantial cumulative experience with
the relevant technologies. Relative frequency approaches' ' to statistical inference simply fail to produce meaningful results. One must
resort to so-called engineering judgment. Objectivity in risk analysis
is impossible within this context.' 6
12. See, e.g., Page, Discounting and IntergenerationalEquity, FUTURES 377 (October
1977).
13. See, e.g., Mishan, Evaluation of Life and Limb: A Theoretical Approach, 79 J. OF
POLITICAL ECON. 687 (July-August 1971).
14. See, e.g., Burness, Cummings, and Norton, Perceived Risk and CatastrophicEvents
(unpublished manuscript).
15. The relative frequency of an event is the number of occurrences divided by the number of trials.
16. See, e.g., Apostolakis, Probability and Risk Assessment: The Subjectivistic Viewpoint and Some Suggestions, 19(3) NUCLEAR SAFETY 305-15 (May-June 1978), espe-
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As a consequence, public perceptions and scientific assessments of
risk often diverge. Moreover, there is significant dissent within the
scientific community itself.' 7 While this kind of dissent seems to
constitute a minority view within the scientific community, it perhaps provides a basis for divergences between scientific estimates and
public beliefs. As an example, the majority opinion of the scientific
community, holding that the risks associated with nuclear power are
relatively low, is by no means uniformly embraced by the general
public in the United States. Part of this divergence may be due to recent technological mishaps such as the fire at Brown's Ferry and the
Three Mile Island incident.' 8 Regardless of the existence of this
divergence between scientific risk estimates and public perceptions of
risk, one must question the relevance of this divergence in terms of
its importance for public policy making.
Documented evidence indicates that the public accurately perceives the potentially catastrophic nature of nuclear accidents and
simultaneously recognizes their relatively low probabilities.' 9 The
potential for large damages in one event weighs importantly in the
public's overall perception of the riskiness of nuclear power. On the
other hand, it has been suggested that public perceptions merely represent phobic thinking about nuclear power.2 0 While it has become
somewhat avant-garde in professional circles to dismiss public perceptions of risk, nevertheless fear and anxiety on the part of the general
public, while perhaps emotional or "irrational," is real. Public concern cannot be peremptorily dismissed as irrelevant.
Interestingly, this divergence between scientific risk estimates and
public perceptions of risk is perhaps most obvious in the arena of nuclear waste disposal. 2' Policymakers face two options in approaching
the relevance of public concern with nuclear waste disposal problems.
They may accept technical estimates that the "expected value" of
damages associated with nuclear accidents is quite low compared to
corresponding estimates for other industries, and assume that public
cially p. 305; see also Kasper, "Real" Versus Perceived Risk: Implicationsfor Policy, in ENERGY RISK MANAGEMENT 87-95 (G. T. Goodman and W. D. Rowe, eds., Academic
Press, London 1979), especially p. 88-89.
17. Burness, Cummings, Norton, supra note 14, at 6.
18. Epps, Garrett, They Bet Your Life, THE WASHINGTON POST MAGAZINE 38-46,
November 18, 1979.
19. Slovic, Lichtenstein, Fischoff, Images of Disaster, Perception and Acceptance of
Risks from Nuclear Power, in ENERGY RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note 16, at 223-45.
20. See, e.g., NUCLEAR PHOBIA-PUBLIC THINKING ABOUT NUCLEAR POWER
(published by The Media Institute, Washington, D.C., March 1980).
21. MELBER, NEALY, HAMMERSKI, and RANKIN, NUCLEAR POWER AND THE
PUBLIC: ANALYSIS OF COLLECTED SURVEY RESEARCH viii-ix (Report PNL-2430,
Battelle Human Affairs Research Center, Seattle, Washington, November 1977).
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fear of nuclear activities will diminish with greater familiarity. Or,
they may accept the concern over risk as a valid component of public
opinion, and give that concern considerable weight in designing nuclear safety programs and in deciding on nuclear and non-nuclear energy alternatives. To some extent, public policy manifests both
approaches. Such a compromise should not be surprising, given the
strength of opinion on both sides of the issue.
THE ANALYSIS OF LIFE RISKS

Skepticism concerning the validity of scientific risk estimates results in part from the methods by which these estimates are developed.
Relative frequency approaches are inappropriate for low probability
events. Scientific risk estimates therefore are customarily developed
through fault tree analyses. Several types of uncertainty inherent in
fault tree risk estimation have raised questions concerning the usefulness of the results of this analysis. In particular, the approach may be
valid for comparing relative risks, but inappropriate for estimating
absolute probabilities. 2 Moreover, there are additional difficulties
relating to thresholds of perception for extremely small probabilities.
Evidence suggests that individuals, when faced with events characterized by very low probabilities but highly dangerous consequences,
ignore probabilities and simply focus on consequences.2 3
At the heart of these discussions remains the simple fact that no
present behavioral theory explains individual decision making under
conditions of low-probability, high-consequence events. For example,
the von Neumann-Morgenstern postulates of behavior with respect to
risk 2 ' would not appear to apply because they are based on the existence of mathematical expectations defined over finite outcomes. In
the case of life risks, one possible outcome (death) may be considered to have an infinite disutility. In addition, there appear to be
behavioral inconsistencies with the von Neumann-Morgenstern results
when individuals are faced with low-probability, high-consequence
events. For example, Kahneman and Tversky cite survey evidence
which violates the substitution axiom concerning the reduction of
compound lotteries on occasions when certainty prizes were involved
... the so-called certainty effect. 2" Further, for lotteries in which
22. See Burness, et al., supra note 14, at 11-14, for a more detailed discussion of fault
tree analysis.
23. Kahneman and Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263-291 (March 1979), especially p. 265.
24. See, e.g., R. LUCE and H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS, ch. 13 (1957).
25. Kahneman and Tversky, supra note 23, at 266. The substitution axiom states that
if the monetary outcome A is preferred to outcome B, then getting A with probability P is
preferred to getting B with probability P (O<P<I).
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winning is possible but not probable (i.e., probabilities are small) individuals tended to ignore probabilities and choose the option involving the larger prize.2 6 As one might expect, the phenomena cited
here are reversed when losses are substituted for gains.
Another particularly interesting phenomenon involves the isolation
of choices in multistage lotteries. For example, for individuals facing
Stage 1: Pr(O)
Pr(Stage 2)
Stage 2: Choose between
A: Pr(4000) = .8

= .75
= .25
and B: Pr(3000) = 1,

where the choice between A and B must be made before the outcome
of Stage 1 is known, 78% chose option B over A even though the
game involves (by combination) a choice between winning $4,000
with probability '/5 versus $3,000 with probability

.24' Apparently,

individuals chose to ignore the first stage of the lottery. Thus, when
the problem was given in "equivalent" (in terms of expected utility
theory) form as
Problem:
C:

Choose between
Pr(4000) = .20

D:

Pr(3000) = .25

65% preferred C, and 35% D. 2 8 This isolation effect apparently may
have substantive importance in developing a theory of choice for lowprobability high-consequence events. Additional survey evidence of
this type was found as early as 1953 by Allain.' 9
Such phenomena tend to refute the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility hypothesis. They suggest the possibility that utility is
to some degree independent of probabilities for some choices, and
perhaps linear in "prizes" and/or decreasing with increasing probability (of losing).
There are even more fundamentally perplexing problems relating
to notions of optimality under uncertainty. The classic result in this
area is by Arrow. 3" Arrow considers a pure trade world in which individuals have non-identical subjective probability beliefs over states
of the environment. He then links the notion of ex ante Pareto optimality to competitive equilibrium positions when a complete set of
26. Id. at 267.
27. I.e., there is only a 25% chance of proceeding to the second stage.
28. Kahneman and Tversky, supra note 23, at 271.
29. Quoted in H. M. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION (1971).
30. Arrow, The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk Bearing, 31 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 91-96 (April 1964).
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contingent claim (futures) markets exists. 3 1 However, a number of
problems exist with this result as noted first in an exchange between
Nagatani and Arrow, 32 and later in independent works by Svennson,3 3 and Burness, Cummings, and Quirk. 3 4
Other related problems arise in conjunction with comparison of
notions of ex ante versus ex post optimality. These problems are particularly relevant in the context of nuclear waste management. Prior
to the introduction of a technology in a specific locale, residents
generally may anticipate risks in such a way that risk estimates appear to be inflated. On the other hand, once exposed to a technology,
there appears to be a tendency for individuals to deny the presence
of risk. 3 Consequently, ex ante perceptions of risk may bear little
resemblance to ex post perceptions. But at the other extreme, risk
perceptions appear to be extremely sensitive to the publicity associated with technologies or related incidents. 3 6
In summary, policy making relative to low probability events involving life risks is thwarted in several ways. First, there exists no appropriate analytical framework for individual decision making in circumstances involving life threats. Such a framework is necessary in
order to develop notions of optimal risk sharing. Second, the manner
in which appropriate or relevant notions of optimality would be defined remains unclear. This uncertainty implicitly involves the problem of deducing from social policies results concerning individual
decision making, as well as ambiguities in ex ante and ex post notions
of optimality. Nonetheless, in spite of these problems and the concomitant lack of a formal decision making model, decisions must be
made with respect to nuclear waste management problems. The exploration of available policy options is therefore instructive.
POLICY OPTIONS
It is helpful at this juncture to attempt at least a crude comparative quantification of the risk associated with nuclear waste manage31. In lay terms, Arrow's result is a formal proof that when there is uncertainty concerning the future existence of competitive markets for all commodities for all possible
future states of the world, then the resulting allocation of commodities is ex ante optimal;
i.e., any other allocation which leaves one individual better off will, of necessity, leave at
least one other individual worse off, in probabalistic terms.
32. See Nagatani, On a Theorum of Arrow, 42 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
483-85 (October 1974), and in the same issue, Arrow, On a Theorem of Arrow: Comment,
at 487-88.
33. Svennson, Sequences of Temporary Equilibria, Stationary Point Expectations, and
Pareto Efficiency, 13 JOURNAL OF ECON. THEORY 169-83 (1976).
34. Burness, Cummings, and Quirk, Ex Ante Optimality and Spot Market Economies
(unpublished manuscript, March 1981).
35. Starr, Rudman, and Wipple, PhilosophicalBasis for Risk Analysis, 1 ANNUAL REVIEW OF ENERGY 629-62 (1976).
36. Id.
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ment. For example, accident probabilities usually are stated in terms
of one in a million, or one in ten million, for the aforementioned
WIPP. 31 By comparison, in New Mexico, the site of WIPP, 95 accidental deaths in the home and 33 work-related deaths occurred in
1978.38 In 1978 there were 485,000 persons employed in New Mexico. 3 9 Thus, the chance (relative frequency) of an accidental death in
other economic enterprises in New Mexico can be calculated to be
roughly one in ten thousand. How risky, then, is waste management
relative to other economic enterprises? Of course, a response to this
question must be tempered by the realization that only a small percentage of existing4 0 or anticipated nuclear waste is scheduled for
burial at the WIPP.
In delineating available policy options, nuclear waste management
is an issue which must be addressed independent of any commitment
(or lack thereof) to nuclear technologies. Even if nuclear power production, weapons development, and other nuclear technologies were
abruptly halted, a sizeable stockpile of nuclear wastes from past activities would still remain. One policy option, that of having no nuclear waste, thus has already been foreclosed.
In the absence of a viable analytical framework within which to
formulate policy, options can perhaps be developed by attempting to
assess the nature of costs associated with waste management technologies. We identify three categories of costs for the purpose of this analysis. Class I costs are the usual costs associated with increased economic activity. These costs include such things as direct project costs,
congestion costs, costs to local governments for providing additional
services, and opportunity costs associated with income or taxes foregone. 4 1 Class I costs are the usual sorts of direct and indirect costs
associated with increased economic activity.
The second class of costs relates more directly to waste management activity per se. These costs arise from the need for such things
as adequate planning, training, equipment, and facilities for emergency preparedness, as well as highway upgrading, for example, to
provide adequate safety in the transportation of wastes. Class II costs
are primarily safety-related and therefore precautionary in nature.
Class III costs are those incurred in the case of an "accident," in
37. U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, WASTE ISOLATION PILOT PLANT, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 6-28 (October 1980). Note that these are accident
probabilities; the number of probable deaths involved is purposely left as an open question.
38. BUREAU OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH, NEW MEXICO STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, 1979-80 144 (The University of New Mexico 1980).

39. Id. at 36.
40. EMD 1139, supra note 11.
41. E.g., construction of the WIPP may result in opportunity costs from foregone mineral and hydrocarbon production.
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this case a release or potential release of radioactivity into the environment. Of the three classes of costs, this class is clearly the most
difficult to quantify. This difficulty is due to our inability to anticipate the nature or magnitude of an accident, and to the fact that
such occurrences are random with virtually unknown probabilities.
Class II and Class III costs, however, are inextricably related. The
incurrence of additional Class II costs may reduce the probability of
an accident and also mitigate the costs associated with such an occurrence. A well-designed policy would therefore seem to involve a balancing of Class II and Class III costs. This is more than just a simplified "safety first" policy, as Class II costs are deterministic and Class
III costs are stochastic; the operational requirement is that these
costs must be balanced. The question then concerns the manner in
which such a balance is to be achieved.
The first step towards striking such a balance involves the construction of accident scenarios. As suggested by Apostolakis, 4 2 all
computed non-historical probabilities below a certain threshold are
suspect. The consequences of an accident rather than its likelihood
are therefore more germane to decision making. For example, the
decision to unload LNG tankers off-shore is based on the potentially
catastrophic magnitude of an LNG explosion, not on its likelihood.
In this case, additional precautionary (Class II) costs are incurred in
order to diminish the level of potentially catastrophic (Class III) costs
to which the populace is exposed. Thus, after the construction of
accident/potential cost scenarios and identification of the Class II
precautionary costs necessary to avoid or mitigate accident costs, a
subjective decision must be made as to whether to incur these costs.
In many cases this procedure will not involve the usual "marginal"
decisions as the choices may be clear cut. In fact, this accident scenario analysis often may not allow the computation of (potential)
accident costs, for reasons cited earlier,4 but rather result only in
physical descriptions of accidents. In the study of the aforementioned WIPP, for example, regional precautionary costs were estimated at 76.8 million dollars, some 27% of total Class I and Class II
regional costs, and only 9% of regional benefits. On the other hand,
these costs were less than 5% of direct projects costs. The various
accident scenarios considered suggest that these precuationary costs
should be incurred. 4 4
At the risk of being repetitive, we again emphasize that the use
42. Apostalakis, supra note 16.
43. Supra note 14.
44. See EMD 1139, supra note 11, at Chapters IV and VII.
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scenario analyses should not be interpreted as a comparison of expected damage estimates with nonstochastic costs of damage avoidance, at least in the context of low-frequency high-consequence
events. Notions of risk, however, should not be abrogated, for if risk
is to be meaningful, it must be weighed against the benefits of the
risky activity. Sometimes benefits take the form of avoidance of a
different risk, For example, in the context of nuclear waste management, a proper assessment of risk cannot be made without considering all the options involved within the nuclear fuel cycle as well as its
alternatives; there are well-known risks involved in fossil-fuel fired
electricity generation, also. Our inability to make separate expected
cost, expected-benefit evaluations for each technology or component
thereof argues for the adoption of a complete-system or wholistic approach to the delineation of all hazards and benefits of each of the
relevant technological alternatives.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Nuclear technologies have been historically characterized by risk in
many different forms. Risks associated with waste management have
come to the fore recently with the more widespread adoption of nuclear technologies. A unique characteristic of this risk results from
the deviation between scientific estimates of risk and risk as perceived
by the general public. Public perceptions have been viewed as phobic,
but appeals to irrationality do not seem adequate to dismiss public
perceptions as irrelevant in terms of public policy making.
This viewpoint is further supported by survey evidence which contradicts the predictions of classical models (e.g., von NeumannMorgenstern) of decision making under uncertainty. These results are
adduced in connection with low-probability, high-consequence events,
unrelated to any specific technologies. One might expect these tendencies to become even more pronounced when life threats are involved.
Unfortunately, in the context of decision making in circumstances
involving life risks, there is apparently no satisfactory conceptual
mode of analysis and no adequate notion of optimality on which to
base a formal model of public policy making.
Consequently, policy options, in this case with respect to nuclear
waste management decisions, must be defined in the absence of formal models. For the case in point, this requires a balancing of precautionary or preventative measures against potentially catastrophic
outcomes-somewhat of a modified safety first doctrine. Decisions
are made using detailed scenario analyses focusing on the consequences of events rather than their likelihood. While such a scenario-
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based analysis ignores probabilities and clearly involves subjective elements, it is by no means intended to advocate a wholesale adoption
of perceived risk theory of decision making. Such an approach is,
however, tantamount to a rejection of mechanistic models of decsion making.

